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ROBUST TOLL PRICING: A NOVEL APPROACH
T. DOKKA, A.B. ZEMKOHO, S. SEN GUPTA, AND F.T. NOBIBON
Abstract. We study a robust toll pricing problem where toll setters and users have differ-
ent level of information when taking their decisions. Toll setters do not have full informa-
tion on the costs of the network and rely on historical information when determining toll
rates, whereas users decide on the path to use from origin to destination knowing toll rates
and having, in addition, more accurate traffic data. Toll setters often also face constraints
on price experimentation which means less opportunity for price revision. Motivated by
this we propose a novel robust pricing methodology for fixing prices where we take non-
adversarial view of nature different from the existing robust approaches. We show that our
non-adversarial robustness results in less conservative pricing decisions compared to tra-
ditional adversarial nature setting. We start by first considering a single origin-destination
parallel network in this new robust setting and formulate the robust toll pricing problem as
a distributionally robust optimization problem, for which we develop an exact algorithm
based on a mixed-integer programming formulation and a heuristic based on two-point
support distribution. We further extend our formulations to more general networks and
show how our algorithms can be adapted for the general networks. Finally, we illustrate
the usefulness of our approach by means of numerical experiments both on randomly gen-
erated networks and on the data recorded on the road network of the city of Chicago.
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1. Introduction and Literature
1.1. Introduction. Road networks played a crucial role in economic and social develop-
ment acting as trade enablers. Hence they find an important place in every government’s
policies. There has been much debate on how roads building should be funded. Tradi-
tionally it has been the case that roads were built and maintained by the funds collected
from the public in the form of taxes. However, many economists, researchers and policy-
makers questioned this practice Lindsay (2006). The main critique being that significant
proportion of the tax payers may not be using the road being built. In fact, in his book The
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued “When the carriages which pass over a highway or
a bridge ... pay toll in proportion to their weight Łthey pay for the maintenance of those
public works exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It
seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works”. This
idea has gained much more attention in last few decades and ever more popular today
than before. As a result private investment in road building has seen a significant in-
crease. Another main reason is that often not enough tax is collected by governments,
especially in developing countries to fund large road building projects. To tackle this
governments are encouraging and attracting private players in road building and many
of these projects are now done under Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) framework. The
PPP-type model is widely adopted due to advantages like bridging the fiscal gap and also
efficient project management practices of private sector companies compared to govern-
mental agencies. For example in India, many new highways are built with PPP type of
model after the introduction of the amendment of National Highway Act 1956 in the year
1995, which enabled private investors participation in highway construction and main-
tenance, see Singh and Kalidindi (2006) and references therein. Typically these projects
employ build-operate-transfer model. Here the investing company enters in a contract
with government to build a road/highway. In return of the investment, the company is
allowed to collect tolls for an agreed period of time before the transfer of ownership to
government. In fact, tolls have become a primary way to encourage private investment
in public infrastructure; see Brown (2005). There are both successes and failures of this
model. One of the notable examples is the M6 toll between Cannock and Coleshill, which
opened in 2003. According to a BBC News Report, “the company operating M6 toll made
a 1 million pound loss in the year 2012”,“drivers have said the road is underused because
of its prices”. Therefore, a key element to the success of this model is the revenue gener-
ated from tolls. The investor company’s main objective is to maximize the revenue from
tolls. Hence the “right” toll price can be the defining factor to the success of the project.
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The key to a successful revenue maximization pricing mechanism lies in understanding
the network users options compared to the toll road.
In Labbe´, Marcotte, and Savard (1998), a bilevel model is proposed to capture the sit-
uation where the toll-setter anticipates the network user’s reaction to his decisions. In a
full information situation it is assumed that costs of travel on the network are fixed and
known to both toll-setter and users. However, cost/time of travel is rarely constant over
time in a real world transportation network. Depending on many factors such as weather,
day and time of week, accidents, etc., there can be considerable variation in cost. Hav-
ing said this our ability to have a reasonably good estimate of travel time has never been
better with latest technology able to provide us with almost real time traffic updates.This
means users may change their decisions over time depending upon then costs/times of
travel in the network. Toll-setter, however, suffers from the disadvantage that (if not al-
ways, more often in practice) he is not allowed to change the toll very frequently due to
policy regulations and other constraints. In most cases, toll is required to be fixed for at
least a minimum period. Even if kept unchanged for a minimum period, changing toll
price and especially increasing, usually has a negative impact on user’s beliefs and may
end up resulting in reduced revenues. In such a situation toll-setter has to make his de-
cisions under uncertainty about user’s future options. On the other hand users have full
(or reasonbly accurate) information before they make their decisions.
In this work we study a robust toll-pricing mechanism which aims to minimize the
risk of the toll-setter against this uncertainty. In doing so, we use the ideas from robust
optimization literature and show that our approach is very near to the conditional value-
at-risk approach used in portfolio optimization and other problems.
1.2. Literature. Profit and revenue maximization problems over a transportation net-
work are given much attention in pricing literature, see for eg., van Hoesel (2008); Bouh-
tou et al. (2007); Karakostas and Kolliopoulos (2004) to name a few. Within a huge body
of papers, many have studied the application of bilevel programming paradigm to pric-
ing problems, such as Labbe´, Marcotte, and Savard (1998); and many subsequent pa-
pers, Cote´, Marcotte, and Savard (2003), Bouhtou, Erbs, and Minoux (2007), Heilporn
et al. (2010), Myklebust, Sharpe, and Tuncel (2016), Dempe and Zemkoho (2012) applied
bilevel framework to several different application areas. A deterministic version of the
problem we study in this paper has been investigated in Labbe´, Marcotte, and Savard
(1998); Brotcorne et al. (2000); Labbe´ and Violin (2013); Heilporn et al. (2011, 2009); van
Hoesel (2008); Bouhtou et al. (2007). However, the stochastic extensions of the problem
have gained more interest only in recent years. Two different stochastic extensions of
the model in Labbe´, Marcotte, and Savard (1998) have been studied in Gilbert, Marcotte,
and Savard (2015) and Alizadeh, Marcotte, and Savard (2013). In Gilbert, Marcotte, and
Savard (2015), authors study the logit pricing problem. Alizadeh, Marcotte, and Savard
(2013) studies the two-stage stochastic problem with recourse extension of deterministic
toll pricing problem also taking view of limited price revision opportunity. In this paper
we study the robust toll pricing problem mainly on single commodity parallel networks
and show that the approach can be extended to general networks. By single commodity
we mean the network has a single origin and single destination and by parallel we mean
there can be several roads connecting origin and destination. The deterministic pricing
problem on such networks is easy to solve using a closed-form formula. That is given
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costs on the alternative roads set the toll to the least cost. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no work on robust pricing in the presence of uncertainty even in such basic net-
works, and as we will show that the pricing problem in these networks can itself be quite
rich. There, however, are two studies where robust optimization framework is applied
to pricing problems, in Violin (2014) and Gardner, Unnikrishnan, and Waller (2010). In
both these works the models considered are different from our model and problem set-
ting. Furthermore, the budgeted uncertainty model considered in Violin (2014) gives
tractable models but may not be best in terms of robustness as found in Dokka and Go-
erigk (2017). Understanding the pricing problem in parallel networks will provide useful
insights into the complexity of pricing for more general networks involving more com-
modities and with variable demands. As we will show that the ideas we propose in this
work will provide a basis for solving toll-pricing problem in more general networks.
The broader scope of the paper is to propose a bilevel type methodology to pricing
problems with limited pricing (or price revising) power. Within this broader scope we
are mainly inspired by the toll pricing problem faced by a risk averse toll setter. Our
aim in this work is to provide a better understanding of the toll-pricing problem faced
by a risk-averse toll-setter when there is uncertainty on non-toll costs. We use the frame-
work of distributional robustness which is very useful in making optimal decisions un-
der limited or imprecise information, see Goh and Sim (2010) for recent developments
on distributionally robust optimization. Our work also fits into the emerging literature
on general static and dynamic pricing that studies pricing problem faced by a seller with
insufficient information about demand. Bergemann and Schlag (2008) and Bergemann
and Schlag (2011) study robust static pricing problems who formulate the problem as
minmax regret problem. Within the dynamic pricing literature we mention here Besbes
and Zeevi (2009); van den Boer and Zwart (2015); Lim and Shanthikumar (2007); Ke-
skin and Zeevi (2014); van den Boer and Zwart (2014). Also see the survey on studies on
dynamic pricing in van den Boer (2015). While most of this literature studies dynamic
pricing and learning and earning problems, to the best of our knowledge none take into
consideration of the case when seller has limited price revising opportunity due to price
controls imposed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: problem definition, assumptions and
some notation are described in Section 2; Section 3 gives the description of the main ro-
bust model proposed in this paper; followed by Section 3.1 where we discuss the inner
or lower level problem in our bilevel formulation; in Section 3.2 we give two algorithms:
one exact based on the MIP formulation for inner problem given Section 3.1 and a two
point heuristic for solving toll pricing problem; Section 4 discusses and illustrates char-
acteristics of our robust model; Section 6 gives the numerical performance of two point
algorithm on simulated and real data sets; Extensions and future work are discussed in
Section 7.
2. Problem definition
We will first describe the deterministic pricing model as used in Labbe´, Marcotte, and
Savard (1998). We consider a single-commodity transportation network with a single
origin and single destination, G = (N,A), where N (of cardinality n) denotes the set of
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nodes, and A (of cardinality m) the set of Arcs. The arc set A of the network G is parti-
tioned into two subsets A1 and A2, where A2 denotes the set of roads which are toll-free
(public roads), and A1 the set of roads which are owned by a toll-setter (toll roads). There
can be two parallel roads between any two nodes in G.
With each toll arc a in A1, we associate a generalized travel cost composed of two parts:
toll (ra) - set by toll-setter expressed in time units, and non-toll cost (ca) - which in our
case varies over time (discretized into unit intervals). An arc a ∈ A2 only bears the non-
toll cost ca. Once the toll is set on arcs in A1, it cannot be changed for T consecutive time
periods. We will refer to T consecutive time periods in which toll is fixed as tolling period.
At the end of the tolling period toll setter may be able to revise his price. However, in this
paper we only consider static pricing problem which can still be used in dynamic case
but does not explicitly optimize pricing decisions over time. We denote b ∈ Rn the fixed
demand, with the assumption that all nodes except origin and destination nodes have
a demand equal to 0. Assuming fixed demand and neglecting congestion implies users
choose shortest paths between the origin and destination. Further we assume that when
faced with two equal alternatives a user will choose the one which maximizes the revenue
of toll-setter. Another key assumption is that it allows conversion from time to money
and assumes it to be uniform throughout the users. In other words, this can be seen one
user using network every time period. Under this setting when the non-toll costs are
known to both toll-setter and user the question toll-setter faces is:How to set prices which
maximizes the total toll revenue when the network user chooses shortest path to minimize his
cost?
The deterministic problem is well understood both conceptually and algorithmically.
Our focus in this paper will be to extend the above deterministic model to the case when
there is uncertainty about non-toll costs ca. That is, non-toll costs are not constant and
can vary over time. Our uncertainty model and assumptions are as follows:
• In our model toll-setter has the historical information encoded in the form of pre-
viously observed states. A state s corresponds to an observed state of the network
in a single time period. In other words, in each state s the non-toll cost on each arc
a ∈ A is fixed denoted as csa. The advantage of modeling uncertainty in this way is
that correlations between different arcs of network are captured in the states.
• The number of states equals to #H × T . That is, toll-setter observes #H tolling
periods. Hereafter we will write T for the rest of all tolling periods assuming toll
setter cannot change his price in the future.
• The cost distribution (unknown to toll-setter) of each arc is assumed to be fixed
and belongs to a set of non-negative distributions D with support in Ω = [q,Q].
One can also consider different supports for different arcs, however, we see Ω as
the aggregated support set.
• We assume the variability on each arc is bounded, that is the variance-to-mean
ratio for the toll period is bounded by a constant which is unknown to the toll-
setter. This is usually the case in real world networks.
Given this setting our aim is to answer the following question faced by a toll-setter:
How to set toll prices under uncertainty of non-toll costs, when network costs are random
with unknown distribution?
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We will now study robust pricing methodologies to answer this question. Starting with
a simple two link parallel network we first review more popular robust methodology and
then propose a new robust methodology.
3. Robust Model
Consider a simple parallel network with just two parallel arcs connecting the origin
and destination. Let one of these arcs be the toll arc and the other arc is the non-toll arc
whose costs are not known. We assume for the ease of exposition that the non-toll costs
on the toll arc are zero or negligible. We will later remove this assumption and show
the method can be extended to such a case. As mentioned in previous section toll-setter
has a sample of costs of #H tolling periods from the recent history. Using this sample,
toll-setter wishes to calculate the toll on the toll arc. Hereafter, we will refer to non-toll
arc as a. In the rest of the section we will drop the suffix a for the ease of notation and
readability. If toll-setter knows the distribution F (we denote the density of F with F)
of c then to fix the toll which maximizes his expected revenue he solves the following
optimization problem which maximizes his expected revenue:
max
r∈Ω
∫Q
r
rF(c)dc. (3.1)
To solve this problem note that we can rewrite the objective as r[1−
∫r
qF(c)dc]. We can
solve the problem by equating the first derivative which is 1−
(∫r
qF(c)dc+ rF(r)
)
to 0.
For example if F is uniform distribution with support Ω then r is obtained by solving
r−q
Q−q + r
1
Q−q = 1, which implies revenue maximizing integer toll is
Q
2 .
In the absence of this knowledge, a risk -averse toll-setter would prefer to insure his
revenues by setting tolls such that the usage of toll arc is maximized as much as possible.
On the other hand, setting toll too low, for example close to q, will result in high usage
but does not necessarily mean better revenue as setting it to a higher price may give much
better revenue. Setting it too high may mean no usage and loss of revenues. Suppose that,
toll-setter first decides his toll and then nature, who plays adversary to toll-setter, will
decide on F. Then toll-setter wishes to calculate a robust toll price which maximizes his
revenue by solving the following optimization problem.
max
r∈Ω
∫Q
r rF(c)dc
s.t. min
F∈D
∫Q
r rF(c)dc
s.t. u ≤ µF(c) ≤ u (3.2)
σ2F (c) ≤ κµF(c)
Here the parameters u, u are calculated as confidence limits of mean; κ is the belief of
toll-setter formed after observing data and also is a parameter controlling the risk averse-
ness of toll setter. This belief can change over time and possibly converge to κ. Assuming
an adversarial nature is very common in robust optimization and online optimization
literature, for example it has been used in Bergemann and Schlag (2008) and Lim and
Shanthikumar (2007). We will refer to this as AN model. Note that the constraints in
(3.2) correspond mainly to nature’s problem i.e., to find a distribution satisfying mean
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(or moment) constraint. The second constraint limits the possible distributions by using
the assumption of bounded variability. Such a situation with sufficiently high allowed
variability gives too much power to adversarial nature forcing toll-setter (to be too con-
servative) to set very low r if he chooses to be robust against all possible F ∈ D. To avoid
such over-conservativeness, we propose to consider that nature does not play such a role.
Instead nature’s objective is to minimize the overall expected cost of the network user,
that is:
∫Q
r
rF(c)dc+
∫ r
q
cF(c)dc, (3.3)
where the first term is the expected cost of travel on toll road and second term is ex-
pected cost on non-toll road. Toll-setter then solves the following bi-level distributionally
robust program to find the robust r:
maxr∈Ω
∫Q
r rF(c)dc
minF∈D
∫Q
r rF(c)dc+
∫r
q cF(c)dc
s.t. u ≤ µF(c) ≤ u (3.4)
σ2F (c) ≤ κµF(c)
We refer to the model (3.4) as UFN model. To illustrate the difference between nature’s
role in formulations (3.2) and (3.4), consider the following example.
Suppose Ω = [1,1] and r = 9, consider two distributions: F1 puts 0.45 probability
mass on 89, 0.5 on 109 and 0.05 on 110; F2 puts 0.135 probability mass on 75 and 0.865
on 104. Between these two distributions a nature with objective in (3.2) will choose first
strategy whereas in (3.4) nature will choose the second one as it minimizes expected cost
of the user which is 87.975 for F2 as against 89.95 for F1.
The main motivation behind our model comes from the deterministic bilevel model
where, under full information, toll-setter and user have conflicting objectives. However,
user’s objective is not to make his decisions to decrease toll-setter’s revenue but to min-
imize his own cost. Similarly, in our model the lower level decision maker is acting to
minimize the expected cost of user by choosing a distribution which is consistent with
the observed mean.
Another way of interpreting UFN model is as follows: the distributions available to
nature in the lower level problem can be seen as willing-to-pay (WtP) distributions of
different users whose mean is consistent with the toll-setter’s belief. In the lower level,
by choosing a user whose expected WtP is minimum, toll-setter is taking robust decision
by choosing a toll which maximizes his revenue from the user with worst expected WtP.
We will now relate UFN model with worst-case conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) opti-
mization. To do this we first rewrite the objective function using the assumption of fixed
support and then introduce a parameter  similar to the risk level in CVaR.
8 T. DOKKA, A.B. ZEMKOHO, S. SEN GUPTA, AND F.T. NOBIBON
Let us start with rewriting the objective function, since we consider F with support in
Ω, we can use
∫Q
r F(c)dc+
∫r
qF(c)dc= 1 and rewrite the nature’s objective function as∫Q
r
rF(c)dc+
∫ r
q
cF(c)dc = r(1−
∫r
qF(c)dc)+
∫r
q cF(c)dc
= r −
∫r
q(r − c)F(c)dc (3.5)
Consider now the following function,
f (r,F) =
[
r −
1
(1− )
∫ r
q
(r − c)F(c)dc
]
,
where  ∈ (,1). Observe that f is nothing but nature’s objective with an additional term
involving . We have the following property of f
Proposition 3.1. For a fixed F ∈ D and  ∈ (,1), f (r,F) is concave and continuously differ-
entiable, and the maximum of f is attained at r ∈Ω such that ∫c≤r F(c)dc= 1− .
Proof. Let G(r) =
∫r
q(r − c)F(c)dc. From Lemma 1 of Rockafeller and Uryasev (2000) G is
a convex continuously differentiable function. Using Fundamental theorem of calculus
and using differentiation by parts, we can derive G ′(r) =
∫
c≤r F(c)dc. This implies
∂f
∂r =
1− 1
(1−)
∫
c≤r F(c)dc, which proves the statement.

Proposition 3.1 implies that if the distribution of c is known to F and toll setter is
interested in finding a toll such that the toll road is used (1 × ) percent of times in
expectation then he should set toll equal to r which satisfies
∫
c≤r F(c)dc = 1− . That is,
 should be interpreted as probability that toll road is used at price r. In other words,
given F when toll-setter decides toll according to (3.1) he indirectly also chooses this
probability. This implies that the bi-level problem in (3.4) can be written as a parametric
single level problem with a max-min objective with parameter  as follows:
maxr∈Ω;∈[,1]minF∈D r − 11−
∫Q
q max(r − c,)F(c)dc
s.t. u ≤ µF(c) ≤ u (3.6)
σ2F (c) ≤ κµF(c)
For a fixed F the objective function in f is very similar to the concept of Conditional-
Value-at-Risk, which has been applied to portfolio optimization problems in Rockafeller
and Uryasev (2000). In fact, our problem formulation is similar to worst-case conditional
value-at-risk studied in Zhu and Fukushima (2009) and more recently in Toumazis and
Kwon (2015).
In the rest of the paper we assume time is discretized and we consider the discrete
version of (3.4) with nature’s objective rewritten using fixed support and can be seen as
nature optimizing over samples C drawn from distributions in D:
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max
r∈Ω r
[
1
T
∑T
i=1 Ir≤ci
]
min
C∈ΩT
[
r − 1T
∑T
i=1max(r − ci ,)
]
s.t. u ≤ µF(c) ≤ u (3.7)
σ2F (c) ≤ κµF(c)
A natural way to solve a bilevel problem is to transform it into a single level problem
by using optimality conditions and/or using any structure present in the inner problem.
Also, the complexity of bilevel problem largely depends on the complexity of the inner
or sometimes called follower’s or lower-level problem. In next section we study the inner
problem of (3.7).
3.1. Inner/Nature’s problem. For a fixed value of toll price r the inner problem in (3.7) is
a minimization problem with a concave objective function. Concave minimization prob-
lem are hard to solve, for some recent work on minimizing quasi-concave minimization
over convex sets see Goyal and Ravi (2013) and references therein. To solve the inner
problem in (3.7) we reformulate the inner problem as the following non-convex integer
programming problem by introducing additional variables:
min
C∈ΩT
[
r − 1T
∑T
i=1 zi
]
(3.8)
s.t. u ≤ µ(c) ≤ u (3.9)
σ2(c) ≤ κµ(c) (3.10)
ci − r + zi ≥  i = 1, . . . ,T (3.11)
r − ci +Myi ≥  i = 1, . . . ,T (3.12)
zi ≤M(1− yi) i = 1, . . . ,T (3.13)
zi −(r − ci)(1− yi) ≤  i = 1, . . . ,T (3.14)
Y ∈ {,1};C,Z ≥  (3.15)
Note that for M in the above formulation any value greater than or equal to Q suffices
which gives our next theorem:
Theorem 3.2. For a fixed r, (3.8)-(3.15) is a valid reformulation of the inner problem of (3.7).
Proof. Constraints (3.11) - (3.13) ensure that yi =  when r > ci and yi = 1 otherwise, and
(3.13)- (3.14) ensure zi = max[r − ci ,]. 
The only non-convex constraint apart from integrality constraints in the above formu-
lation is (3.14). We linearize this by introducing two additional sets of variables as fol-
lows. Replace the product terms ryi and ciyi in this constraint by variables ui and vi and
then add constraints (3.23)-(3.28). After doing this we get the following convex integer
programming problem.
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min
C∈ΩT
[
r − 1T
∑T
i=1 zi
]
(3.16)
s.t. u ≤ µ(c) ≤ u (3.17)
σ2(c) ≤ κµ(c) (3.18)
ci − r + zi ≥  i = 1, . . . ,T (3.19)
r − ci +Myi ≥  i = 1, . . . ,T (3.20)
zi ≤M(1− yi) i = 1, . . . ,T (3.21)
zi − r + ci +ui − vi ≤  i = 1, . . . ,T (3.22)
ui ≤Myi i = 1, . . . ,T (3.23)
vi ≤Myi i = 1, . . . ,T (3.24)
vi ≤ ci i = 1, . . . ,T (3.25)
ui ≤ r i = 1, . . . ,T (3.26)
r −M(1− yi) ≤ u ≤ r i = 1, . . . ,T (3.27)
Y ∈ {,1};C,Z,U,V ≥  (3.28)
Theorem 3.3. (3.16)-(3.28) is a valid reformulation of (3.8)-(3.15).
Proof. To see this is true note that for every solution to (3.8)-(3.15) we can create an equiv-
alent solution to (3.16)-((3.28)) by taking the C, Z, Y values as they are and putting ui = r
and vi = ci for every i with yi = 1 and  otherwise. 
For a fixed r, (3.16) - (3.28) can be solved using a state of the art commercial solver
like CPLEX and more specialized algorithms are also conceivable owing to tremendous
success and availability of techniques for solving convex quadratic integer programs in
last few years. We will now look at solving the toll setting problem.
3.2. SolutionAlgorithms. We will first give an exact algorithm which adds an additional
constraint to (3.16) - (3.28) which can be given to a solver like CPLEX; then we move on
to simple heuristic.
3.2.1. Exact Algorithm. Proposition 3.1 implies that for a fixed  ∈ { 1T , 2T , . . . ,1} we can add
the constraint (3.29) to (3.16) - (3.28) and solve the inner problem treating r as variable.
This will give us a maximum price to have toll road used T times. We will formally give
this in Algorithm 1. ∑
i
yi
T
≤  (3.29)
3.2.2. Two-point Heuristic. The formulation given in (3.16)-(3.28) can be hard to solve
and can be time consuming when using the generic solvers like CPLEX. Of course, one
can derive efficient algorithms using branch and bound and/or other methodologies. In
this section, however, we focus on constructing a simple approximate solution to toll
pricing problem. In our computational experience of solving (3.16) using CPLEX we
found that in all cases the solution found has two-point support. That is, the vector of
costs returned by CPLEX has exactly two distinct values. If we restrict to the distributions
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Algorithm 1 Robust Toll Algorithm
INPUT: u, u, κ
R= φ
for  ∈ { 1T , 2T , . . . ,1} do
Solve (3.16) - (3.28) +
∑
i yi
T ≤ 
Let r be solution output; r ∈ R
end for
OUTPUT: r = arg maxr
with two-point support {`,u}, assuming ` ≤ r ≤ u, the nature’s problem (3.16)-(3.28) can
be written as
min
`∈Ω,u∈Ω;λ∈[,T ]
r(T −λ)+ `λ
s.t.(T −λ)u+λ` = µT
u ≤ µ ≤ u
λ(`−µ)2+(T −λ)(u−µ)2 ≤ κµ(T − 1)
Suppose that we fix µ= u, we can write the problem of finding of {`,u} as
min
`∈Ω,u∈Ω;λ∈[,T ]
r(T −λ)+ `λ
s.t.(T −λ)u+λ` = µT
λ(`−µ)2+(T −λ)(u−µ)2 ≤ κµ(T − 1)
Eliminating u, we get
min
`∈Ωλ∈[,T ]
rT −λ(r − `) (3.30)
s.t.λ(`−µ)2+(T −λ)([
µT −λ`
(T −λ)
] −µ)2 ≤ κµ(T − 1)
For a fixed λ, the objective function in (3.30) is linear in ` with a positive slope. This
implies that the solution to (3.30) simply is the lowest value satisfying the inequality in
(3.30) and u ∈ Ω. Using this observation we now give a simple algorithm for finding a
two-point solution to (3.16). Hereafter we will denote the integers inΩ by Ω¯.
Algorithm 2 approximately solves by searching for all values of λ, where obj is the
objective in (3.30). Note we search for ` ∈ Ω¯, this is for numerical simplification and
moreover given that r ∈ Ω¯ this will only result in minor loss in terms of approximation.
Note that the heuristic presented in Algorithm 2 is aimed mainly for a quick solution
where we fix µ = u and κ = κ and the run-time complexity of algorithm is O(|Ω¯|2). We
now prove that the optimal solution to the nature’s problem for a fixed toll is indeed a
two-point distribution.
Theorem 3.4. The optimal solution to nature’s problem is always a two-point distribution.
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Algorithm 2 Two Point Algorithm
INPUT: u, κ
Set BR(r) =  for all r ∈ Ω¯\u;BR(u) = 1
for r ∈ Ω¯ do
λ= T − 1, µ= u
while λ ≥ 1 do
` = 
while ` < µ do
u = ((µ×T )−(λ×`))
(T−λ)
if u ≤Q and λ(`−µ)2+(T −λ)([µT−λ`
(T−λ) ] −µ)
2 ≤ κµ(T − 1) then
if obj > (λ× `+(T −λ)× r) then
obj = (λ× `+(T −λ)× r)
BR(r) = r × (T −λ)
end if
break
else
` = `+ 1
end if
end while
λ= λ− 1
end while
end for
OUTPUT: argmaxr∈Ω¯BR(r)
Proof. From Popescu (2007) it is enough to consider three-point distributions. In Birge
and Dula (1991), it is shown that a two point distribution (z, r3) with the same mean and
variance as the three point distribution can be found, where r1 < z < r2. Suppose that the
optimal three point distribution is 3D = r1, r2, and r3 with probabilities p1, p2 and p3.
Now consider a two-point distribution 2D = (z, r3) with probabilities (p1 + p2,p3) with
r1 < z < r2 with the same mean and variance at most that of 3D.
The variance of 2D is at most that of 3D. To see this note that the following inequality
is true:
p1(z− r1)
p2(r2− z)
≤ r2+ z
r1+ z
, (3.31)
LHS is equal to 1 due to equivalence of means and RHS is clearly ≥ 1. Rearranging terms
and adding p3r23 on both sides we get,
(p1+ p2)z
2+ p3r
2
3 ≤ p1r21 + p2r22 + p3r23 . (3.32)
To show that 2D has a lower expected cost we need to show that
(p1+ p2)g(z)+ p3g(r3) ≤ p1g(r1)+ p2g(r2)+ p3g(r3) (3.33)
where g(x) = r if x ≥ r and x otherwise.
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Consider first the case when r = r2. From the equivalence of means we have
p1(z− r1) = p2(r − z) (3.34)
rearranging and adding p3r on both sides we get
(p1+ p2)z+ p3r = p1r1+ p2r2+ p3r (3.35)
which is (3.33).
The case when r2 < r follows using a similar reasoning as above. Now consider the case
when r2 > r. It is enough to observe that increasing r to r2 will not change nature’s optimal
action 3D, in which case setting r to r2 gives improved revenues to toll setter with same
nature’s response. 
4. Characteristics of UFN model
In this section we study the characteristics of UFN model. In Section 4.2 we compare
the performance of UFN tolls with AN tolls and illustrate how the optimal solutions of
nature’s problem react to change in tolls. Before that we first discuss the model with
discrete set of costs.
4.1. Discrete costs. Given that we are inspired mainly by toll prices it should be noted
that in many cases prices usually are not any continuous values. Instead, prices are almost
always numbers with up to two significant digits. This motivates us to consider the case
when Ω is discrete set of prices with minimum price equal to q and maximum equal to
Q. We will defineΩ= {cj : j ∈ J}, where J is the index set of all allowed prices. In this case
toll pricing problem can be formulated as following:
maxr∈Ω
∑
j :cj≥r xjr (4.1)
minX
∑
j :cj≥r xjr +
∑
j :cj<r
xjcj (4.2)
s.t.
∑
j∈J xj = 1 (4.3)∑
j∈J cjxj = µ (4.4)∑
j∈J xjc2j −µ2 ≤ κµ (4.5)
Where xj is the probability mass assigned to price cj ∈Ω, first constraint corresponds
to the mean (first moment) constraint and second constraint to the bounded variability.
In this case the nature’s problem is simply a linear program, which is easy to solve. Also,
using linear programming theory it is easy to note that the optimal solution has at most
three support points. However, in numerical experiments we found that in many cases it
is either a two point distribution or it is three point distribution with two support points
very close to each other. We now use this formulation to illustrate some characteristics of
UFN model.
4.2. AN vs UFN. In this section we empirically show how UFN model is better and less
conservative compared to the usual robust approach of AN model. To compare the behav-
ior of these two models we solved the nature’s problem of both models for a discreteΩ by
varying tolls. In AN model, the distribution found is always such that, the lower support
point of distribution is very close to the set toll price. Resulting in very low revenues. Un-
der such model toll setter will be forced to set the toll to lowest price for given moment
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constraints. On the other hand UFN model exhibits a concave like revenue curve. That is,
as toll increases revenues may increase up to a point and then decreases. This behavior
is illustrated in Figure 1 where numerical experiment done has Ω = [,1], with tolls
changed between 35 and 5, with µ = 5 and κ = 6. Figure 2 illustrates the changes
0
100
200
300
0 50 100 150
Toll
Reve
nue
AN
UFN
Figure 1. Comparison of revenues for varying tolls between user-friendly
and adversarial nature
in the lower support point, revenue and nature’s objective values for the UFN two point
distribution as the toll is increased with the same parameters as for Figure 1.
200
300
400
0 50 100 150
Toll
 
Lower support point
Nature's objective
Revenue
Figure 2. Change in two-point distribution as toll increases
4.3. Impact of κ. As mentioned in Section3, κ¯ indicates the belief of the toll setter about
the level of uncertainty. In other words a higher value of κ¯ compared to κ indicates that
the toll setter is overly pessimistic. This implies he will try to set a lower toll and hence
will have lesser revenue. This is reflected in the illustration given in Figure 3 where we
plot revenue from optimal two point UFN distribution as toll and κ¯ values are changed
with mean kept constant. The vertical line of revenues against each toll value correspond
to different values of κ¯ with top values corresponding to smaller κ¯ . The behavior of the
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revenue curve is such that the maximizing point (w.r.t the two point distribution found)
shifts to the left when κ¯ value is higher as the toll increases. For the numerical experiment
used in Figure 3 the parameters were set toΩ= [,1], tolls changed between 35 and
5, µ= 5 and κ¯ = [5,6]. It is also worth noting, with toll closer to mean the variation
in the revenue is very less with varying κ¯.
280
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Figure 3. Change in two-point distribution as toll increases
4.4. Normal Distribution - Entropy. In order to assess the performance of UFN model
we compared the distribution calculated in the lower level to the case when the distribu-
tion of c is Normal with same mean and variance. Figure 4 gives the change in cumulative
probabilities, for a fixed toll with same mean but changing variance, of two-point distri-
bution calculated in nature’s problem versus the actual Normal distribution.The mean
is set to 5 with variance changing between 1 and 6 with support in [,1]. The
tolls are set at 300, 350 and 400 for Figures (4a)-(4c) respectively. The plots give cumu-
lative probabilities in both cases, that is cumulative probability in both distributions at
toll value. More formally, plots give PUFN (c ≤ r) and PN(c ≤ r) as variance is changed for
three different values of r. It can be seen that two point distributions calculated are very
close to the normal case. Furthermore, the distribution gets better when the toll value is
increased from 300 to 350, and again the distance between curves increases with increase
in toll away from 350. This indicates the UFN approach will give close to optimal tolls
when the distribution of c is Normal given that toll setter has a correct belief about the κ¯.
We believe this behavior is related to maximum entropy probability distributions. The
entropy of a probability distribution represents the amount of uncertainty associated
with the distribution. The distribution maximizing the entropy is believed to be a good
prior distribution. As observed by Perakis and Roels (2008) entropy maximization is not
a decision making criteria which can be used under uncertainty, it can only be used as
selection criteria for selecting a probability distribution within a stochastic model. Also,
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Figure 4. Comparison of two-point distribution calculated at lower level
for fixed toll with Normal distribution with same mean and variance
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it is similar to a barrier function (Boyd and van den Berghe (2004)). The entropy of a
discrete random variable with a given distribution is defined as,
H(c) = −
∑
i
p(ci)logp(ci). (4.6)
Our approach can be related to maximizing entropy by replacing the logp(x) with g(x).
In other words maximizing (minimizing negative of) a similar measure as entropy. Let
Gr(x) be defined as
Gr(c) =
1
D
∑
i
p(ci)g(ci), (4.7)
where is D is some fixed constant, then G is an approximation of H for each value of r.
Our approach can be interpreted as approximating H using G by choosing r = ci where
ci(1−
∑
ci>=r
p(i)) is maximized. We wonder if it is possible to quantify this relationship
and leave it for the future study.
5. Pricing in General networks
5.1. Multiple parallel arcs. Let us first consider the immediate extension to a network
where there are k non-toll arcs parallel to the toll arc between origin and destination.
Let a1, . . . , ak be the non-toll arcs. We input the mean and variance limits (u, u and κ) of
the data obtained from taking the following minima, minki=1 c
s
ai to calculate the two point
robust toll.
Let us now consider the above network when the assumption that the non-toll costs on
toll arc are not zero. Let ak+1 be the toll arc. To apply our method to this case we calculate
the mean and variance limits (u, u and κ) of
k
min
i=1
[csai − c
s
ak+1 ] (5.1)
for all s.
5.2. General networks. Consider now a general single commodity network with multi-
ple toll arcs, for example the network on the left given in Figure 5. To apply UFN ap-
proach we construct an equivalent parallel network as shown in the right side in Figure
5. For each path in this parallel network with toll arcs we will calculate the state minima
given in (5.1) by ignoring all other paths with toll arcs. That is we calculate the robust toll
on each toll path as if that is the only path with toll arcs in the network. This we treat as
an upper bound on the total toll on that path. We then solve an integer/linear program-
ming problem to allocate the tolls to individual toll arcs. Suppose the upper bounds for
the paths in the example network in Figure 5 are ς1, ς2, ς3 respectively from left to right,
then we solve the following optimization problem to solve for prices of r1, r2, and r3
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max r1+ r2+ r3
s.t r2+ r3 ≤ ς1
r1+ r2 ≤ ς2
r1 ≤ ς3
ri ∈Z
O 
D 
r1 
r2 
r3 
O 
D 
r2  + r3 
r1   
r1  + r3 
Figure 5. General network and an equivalent parallel network
In theory there can be many paths between any two nodes in a network. However, in
practice especially in real world transportation networks the number of paths between
any two nodes/cities is usually small or limited. Also, many paths between pairs of cities
are far from optimal in any of the scenarios, that is they are usually dominated by a few
number of paths. We observed this in Chicago data where there may be several paths
between two cities but most often it was only few paths which were optimal with many
paths never optimal, not even in a single state. So, in practice even if there are many
paths we can still use the above approach.
6. Computational experiments
We performed two sets of numerical experiments to assess the UFN model, first set
of experiments is on simulated data while the second set of experiments are performed
on real-world traffic data collected by City of Chicago. In Section 6.2 we present our
numerical results on simulated data. In Section 6.3 we assess the performance of two
point toll algorithm on City of Chicago data.
6.1. Performance metric. A commonly used metric to measure the robustness of an al-
gorithm in pricing literature is (relative) regret. We follow this practice and we use the
percentage relative regret from using the robust toll which is calculated as follows:
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Distribution First parameter second parameter
Beta [2,5] [2,5]
Beta [1,3] [1,3]
Gamma [1,3] [13 ,
1
5 ]
Normal [90,110] [10,30]
Lognormal [0.1,0.3] [0.1,0.3]
Table 1. Distributions and parameters used
relative regret(%) =
optimal revenue - robust toll revenue
optimal revenue
,
where optimal revenue is revenue obtained by using the optimal price. From these ex-
periments we want to understand the answers to the following two questions:
• how bad are revenues from robust tolls compared to the optimal revenues?
• how do robust tolls compare to optimal tolls?
In both experiments we used the two-point approximate algorithm to compute the robust
tolls, and we set T = 5, #H = 1, and ¯kappa= 1.
6.2. Simulated data. In this section we report the performance of our approach with
numerical experiments on simulated data. We have done experiments to assess the ro-
bustness of our procedure under two different experimental set-ups differing in network
structure and cost distributions. We explain them below.
• First-Experiment: We consider a parallel network with five parallel links connect-
ing origin to destination. In this set-up we fix the distributions of the links to be
same but allow the parameters to vary randomly within a given interval.
• Second-Experiment: We consider the same network as in first but the distribu-
tions on each links can be different including parameters.
In both experiments we would like to understand the robustness of the two-point toll.
The distributions we use are Beta, Gamma, Normal and Lognormal. The parameters for
each distribution are selected uniformly from an interval. The parameter intervals are
given in Table 1.
We first created 50 samples (history sample), from each distribution which are used to
calculate the robust tolls. We then created 2500 random samples from each distribution
and computed optimal revenue generating tolls for each of these samples. We compare
the revenues from optimal tolls in each of these 2500 samples with revenues when a
robust toll is used which is calculated from a sample in history sample. To calculate
an optimal toll for a given instance we try each integer in Ω¯ and select the toll which
generates the most revenue. In total we compare robust tolls with optimal tolls on 125000
samples.
6.2.1. Results and Discussion: Fixed distributions. In this section we will evaluate the ro-
bustness of our two-point robust toll on the instances when all parallel arcs have same
distributions but the parameters can be selected randomly in the intervals given in Table
1. Table 2 displays the average percentage relative regret for each of the four distribu-
tions. From Table 2 we observe that the robust toll achieves a regret less than 14% in
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all distributions with except Gamma all other figures below 1%. On the other hand we
observed fixing the toll equal to sample mean can have give regret as high as 23%. Fur-
thermore, as seen from standard deviation values variation in regrets is also not large.
This suggests that revenues from robust toll compare well especially given the fact that
the toll decision is taken with minimal knowledge about the network cost distributions.
As previously pointed out a measure of robustness of the toll is how it compares with
the optimal revenue generating tolls. Figure 6a-6d displays the comparison of minimum,
maximum and average values of tolls over the 50 history samples, and optimal revenue
generating tolls in each of the 2500 samples (sorted in increasing order). From Figure 6a-
6d we observe that it is possible that the UFN tolls can be too high or too low especially
as seen in Normal distributions. However, the average robust toll compares well with
optimal tolls and is very close to average optimal toll in almost all with slightly below
average in case of Beta. Also the variability in robust tolls displayed in Table 3 illustrates
the robustness of UFN tolls. Figures also suggest that with a higher #H the variability can
be further reduced.
In Figures (7a)- (7d), we plot the performance for the four distributions when using
average of the robust tolls found using the 50 history samples against the best static
optimal toll treating each instance in the set of 2500 as a tolling period but toll setter
cannot revise his price. In other words Here we report the cumulative regrets over time.
By cumulative regret we mean regret up to period t calculated against a static optimal
toll price. Since we compare against the static optimal price in the earlier periods average
robust toll may perform well showing zero regret. As can be seen the cumulative regret
from average robust price is less than 2% in all cases.
Distribution Average Stdev
Beta 7.62 5.77
Gamma 13.57 12.51
Lognormal 8.31 8.18
Normal 7.36 8.12
Table 2. Fixed case: average (%) relative regret
6.2.2. Results and Discussion: Mixed distributions. In this section we will evaluate the ro-
bustness of UFN toll when arcs in the (same) network can have different distribution
with parameters again chosen randomly from intervals given in Table 1. We observe
Distribution Robust toll
Stdev
Beta 4.94
Gamma 8.56
Lognormal 5.16
Normal 5.13
Table 3. robust toll variation
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Figure 6. Comparison of optimal tolls with robust tolls with top, middle
and bottom horizontal lines corresponding to maximum, average and min-
imum robust tolls.
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Figure 7. dynamic case performance.
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Distribution Average Stdev
Beta 6.44 5.77
Gamma 10.2 12.51
Lognormal 6.73 8.18
Normal 5.11 8.12
Table 4. Fixed case: average (%) relative regret with average robust toll
Distribution Average Stdev
Mixed 7.84% 6.2%
Table 5. Exp 3: average (%) relative regret
from Table 5 that average regret from the robust toll is less than that in the case of fixed
distribution case. This is also reflected in Figure 8 which again displays the comparison
of minimum, maximum and average values of robust tolls with optimum revenue gen-
erating tolls. The average robust toll is again slightly higher than but very close to the
optimal average.
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Figure 8. Exp. 3: Comparison of optimal tolls with robust tolls
6.3. Real data. In real world the times of travel and hence costs may not have any known
distribution which can be analytically expressed and may have seasonality and trends
over time. Moreover, model which performs well on simulated data may not perform
well on real data as modeling assumptions may not be satisfied. To test our approach on
real data which as we explain below is given as travel times on a real road network, we
assume the generalized cost is proportional to the time taken. We first explain the details
of data collection and then give then details of experimental setup and results.
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Robust toll mean-variance toll Robust toll mean-variance toll
Average Average Stdev Stdev
5.64% 30.08% 5.01% 5.64%
Table 6. real data: average (%) relative regret
6.4. Data Collection and Cleaning. We used data provided by the City of Chicago1,
which provides a live traffic data interface. We recorded traffic updates in a 15-minute
interval over a time horizon of 24 hours for several days between March 28th 2017 to May
13th 2017. A total of 4363 data observations were used.
Every observation contains the traffic speed for a subset of a total of 1,257 segments.
For each segment the geographical position is available, see the resulting plot in Fig-
ure 9a with a zoom-in for the city center. There were 1,045 segments where the data
was recorded at least once of the 4363 time points. We used linear interpolation to fill the
missing records keeping in mind that data was collected over time. Segment lengths were
given through longitude and latitude coordinates, and approximated using the Euclidean
distance.
As segments are purely geographical objects without structure, we needed to create
a graph for our experiments. To this end, segments were split when they crossed or
nearly crossed, and start- and end-points that were sufficiently close to each other were
identified as the same node. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 9b; note that this
process slightly simplified the network, but kept its structure intact. The final graph
contains 538 nodes and 1308 arcs.
6.5. Experimental Setup, Results and Discussion. We assume cost of travel on each
road in this network is proportional to the time of travel. Since there are no toll roads in
this network which we can use for our experiments we have randomly selected 200 pairs
of cities and calculated tolls by imagining a toll road between these each of these pair of
cities, under the assumption that non-toll cost is zero or such costs have been adjusted
in the costs of the other roads. Of 4363 observations we used 2100 as history and all
observations for calculating the regrets in all of 200 cases.
The average percentage regret over 200 pairs is given in Table 6. As can be seen the
average regret is less than that observed in simulated case. Interestingly, unlike the case
of simulate data UFN tolls were set higher than optimal for all pairs which indicates the
non-conservative of the approach. Figure 10 illustrates distribution of ratio of UFN tolls
over optimal tolls. UFN toll was set roughly 12% higher in extreme case with most tolls
within 5% of optimal tolls.
7. Dynamic pricing and Future Work
In practice a toll setter may be able to revise the toll. However, revising power of toll
setter is hugely limited as often they are subject to price controls such as caps on price
increase and the number of increases. Also, the assumption of toll setter able to observe
the cost may not be true or may be subject to inaccurate assumptions. In Dokka, Jacko,
and Aslam (2017), the UFN model is extended to the dynamic case with price controls
where toll setter learns the distribution by changing the price dynamically and observing
1https://data.cityofchicago.org
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Figure 9. Chicago instance
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Figure 10. Exp. 3: Comparison of optimal tolls with robust tolls
the usage. The new robustness model can also be extended to more general networks
such as multi-commodity networks and also including variable demands. We consider
these extensions for our future work.
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